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In this paper, we show that the monetary rule followed by a number of key 
countries  before  1914  represented  a  commitment  technology  preventing  the 
monetary authorities from changing planned future policy.  The experiences of 
these major countries suggest that the gold standard was intended as a contin- 
gent rule.  By  that, we mean  that  the authorities could  temporarily abandon 
the fixed price of gold during a wartime emergency on the understanding that 
convertibility at the original price of gold would be restored when the emer- 
gency passed. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI.  Introduction 
The gold standard has been a subject of perennial interest to both econo- 
mists and economic historians.  Attention has focused on three aspects of the 
gold  standard's  performance:  as an international exchange-rate  arrangement; 
as a provider  of macroeconomic  stability; and as a  constraint  on government 
policy actions. 
The balance-of-payments  adjustment  mechanism,  or  the  links between  the 
money  supplies,  price  levels, and  real outputs of different  countries under 
fixed exchange rates, has long been studied as the key aspect of the interna- 
l  tional  exchange-rate  arrangement  of  the gold  standard.  The  durability  of 
fixed exchange rates,  the absence of  exchange-market  crises,  and  the smooth 
adjustment to the massive transfers of capital in the decades before 1914 have 
been features stressed in monetary reform proposals ever since. 
The gold standard often has been viewed as ensuring long-run,  though not 
necessarily  short-run,  price  stability  via  the  operation  of  the  classical 
commodity  theory  of  money.  Recent  comparisons  between  the  classical  gold 
standard and  subsequent managed  fiduciary monetary  regimes suggest, however, 
that  the  record  is  mixed  with  respect  both  to price-level  and  real-output 
2  performance. 
Finally, the gold  standard has also been viewed as a form of constraint 
over  monetary  policy  actions --  as a  form  of  monetary  rule.  The Currency 
School in England  in the early nineteenth  century made  the case for the Bank 
of England's  fiduciary note issue to vary automatically with the level of the 
Bank's  gold  reserve  ("the currency  principle").  Following  such a  rule was 
viewed  as preferable  (for providing  price-level  stability)  to  allowing  the 
note  issue to be  altered at  the discretion of  the well-meaning  and possibly 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwell-informed directors of the Bank (the position taken by the opposing Bank- 
3  ing School). 
In this paper, we focus on the third aspect of the gold standard*  s per- 
formance --  on the gold  standard  as a  rule.  However, our meaning  of the 
concept of a rule differs radically from what used to be the traditional one. 
In our view.  a rule can be regarded as a way of binding policy actions over 
time.  This view of policy rules, in contrast to the earlier tradition that 
stressed both impersonality and automaticity, stems from the recent literature 
on the time inconsistency of optimal government policy.  Discretion, in this 
approach, means  setting policies  sequentially.  This  literature has demon- 
strated that, in almost all  intertemporal policy  situations, the government 
would benefit from having access to a commitment technology preventing it from 
changing  planned  future policy.  Examples have  shown  that  these  benefits 
theoretically can be  substantial.  In this paper, we use that literature as a 
framework for understanding the historical operation of the gold standard. 
For the period from 1880 to 1914, the gold standard often is viewed as a 
monolithic regime where all countries religiously followed the dictates of the 
rule of a fixed price of gold.  Before 1880, most countries were on a form of 
specie standard: either bimetallism  or silver or gold monometallism.  As  we 
point out below, however, from our perspective the bimetallic standards that 
many  countries followed were  a variant  of  the gold-standard  rule.  This Is 
contrasted to  the period since 1914, when central banks and governments to a 
great extent have geared their policies to satisfy more immediate objectives 
without considering intertemporal consequences in terms of lack of commitment 
to a  long-run rule governing policy.  In  this paper, we show that  the rule 
followed by  a number of  key  countries --  England,  the U.S., and  France -- 
before 1914 was consistent with such a commitment.  The experiences of these 
major  countries suggest  that  the gold  standard was intended as a contingent 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrule.  By  that, we mean  that  the authorities temporarily could abandon the 
fixed  price  of  gold  during  a  wartime  emergency  on  the  understanding  that 
convertibility at  the original price would  be  restored  when  the  emergency 
passed. 
Section I1 presents a framework for discussing the benefits of being able 
to commit to future government policy.  Moreover,  it  interprets the institu- 
tions of the gold-standard era in light of this framework.  Section I11 sur- 
veys the historical record on the adherence to the gold-standard rule by three 
core countries: England, the U.S., and France, and by a country that is gener- 
ally  believed not to have adhered to  the rule:  Italy.  Finally.  Section IV 
attempts to draw some lessons from history. 
11.  The Gold Standard as a  Contingent Rule 
The Value of Comitment 
A  long-standing question  in  public  finance  is  how  to  finance varying 
quantities of government expenditures in such a way as to minimize deadweight 
loss to  society.  In the  last decade. this question, which dates back  to the 
pioneering work  by  Ramsey  (1927!,  more  and  more  has  shifted from  static to 
dynamic environments.  We shall argue that  the  intertemporal framework pre- 
sented in this literature is the appropriate one for evaluating the operation 
of  the gold standard. 
The focus of this literature initially centered around the incentives (in 
the absence of a commitment mechanism  to prevent the government from changing 
its  policy  rule  in  the  future) for  excessive  taxation  of  capital  income. 
Clearly. however, similar arguments can be  made with respect to  the taxation 
of  (or default on) government debt.  We discuss the source of time inconsis- 
tency of optimal policy in both contexts.  We start with the former because 
capital income, at  least in this century, probably would be a main source of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmemergency financing, for example during a war,  for a government without  the 
credibility to  issue much debt.  Then,  we  introduce government debt  policy, 
which we contend is the major reason why the gold standard was adhered to in 
some countries for long periods of time. 
Consider the following prototype model of optimal taxation.'  The economy 
is inhabited by  a large number of  consumers who,  for simplicity, are treated 
as  identical.  Each  consumer maximizes  infinite-horizon  discounted utility, 
apt  u(ct,nt,gt.ot),  where ct is consumption, nt is hours of work, gt is per 
capita government  purchases.  and  B  is  the subjective discount factor.  The 
parameter o  is stochastic and may  indicate,  for instance, how the value of 
t 
defense expenditures varies over  time depending on  the political  situation. 
There is  little loss of  generality, however,  in simply assuming that  the g 
t 
process  itself  is  exogenous.  Thus,  the  typical  consumer  is  assumed  to 
maximize 
and nonnegativity constraints.  Here, w  is the real wage rate.  and at and r 
t  t 
are the tax rates for capital and  labor  income, respectively.  One can think 
of kt  as including various forms of  capital, with rt being  the rental income 
from  ouning  the  capital  stock.  With  little modification,  one  could  also 
include human capital, which in practice can be  taxed more heavily; for exam- 
ple, by  increasing the progressivity of  the income-tax schedule. 
In  this economy, consumers choose  sequences of  c  n  and  kt+l,  while 
t*  t* 
the government decides on sequences of  8  and  r .  Interpreting aggregates as 
t  t 
measured  in per  capita  terms,  a formulation of  the optimal taxation problem 
is: Choose a sequence n  =  (9,. rt}yd  so as to maximize 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsubject to 
gt s8rk  +~wn 
ttt  ttt 
and the constraints implied by equilibrium aggregate behavior of the atomistic 
private agents.  This behavior can be written as sequences x  (n )  =  (ct  (no), 
0  0 
m  (n )jt*;  in other words, the equilibrium aggregate private deci-  nt(no)*  kt+l  0 
sions at time t depend on the entire sequence of policy decisions.  The solu- 
tion, n ,  to  this  optimal  taxation  problem,  together  with  the  associated 
0 
equilibrium, xo(no),  is sometimes referred to as a Ramsey allocation. 
The heart of the time-consistency issue is as follows.  Suppose no is the 
plan that solves the optimal  taxation problem as of  time zero.  Imagine now 
that  the analogous problem  is contemplated  as of  time  s >  0.  The optimal 
taxation problem then has a solution ns,  which generally is different from the 
part of n  that specifies the plan for periods t =  s,s+l,  ....  In other words, 
0 
the original plan, no, is inconsistent with the passage of time.  The reason 
is  that  n*  takes into account the effects of  government policy planned  for 
dates after period s on private behavior at dates before s.  At  time s, how- 
* 
ever, when n  is computed, private behavior at earlier dates, of course, can 
s 
no longer be affected. 
This prototype model  highlights the following two points.  One is that 
the  source of  time  inconsistency  is  not  that  the  objective  function of  the 
government  has  a  different  form  than  the  individuals'  utility  functions. 
Also,  it is clear  that  time  inconsistency arises in  spite of  an unchanging 
objective function over time.  Instead, key factors are the fact that consum- 
ers care more about their own allocations than about  the aggregate, combined 
with decisions being made sequentially over time when future government policy 
affects current private behavior. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmIn the optimal plan, when an increase in gt occurs, the incentive effects 
on labor input of raising T  are weighed against the effects on savings behav- 
t 
ior from changing 8  Once the capital stock is in place, however, the opti- 
t' 
ma1  plan from then on, taking history up to  that point  as given, is to  tax 
capital more heavily, as it will be supplied inelastically,  and then to reduce 
future capital  taxation.  Of  course, the government's  change of  action  is 
likely to create beliefs among the public that a similar change of plans will 
take place again sometime in the future, regardless of what plan the govern- 
ment announces. 
This framework assumes that  the government balances its budget  in every 
period.  If the changes in government expenditures can be large at times, such 
as during wars, the required changes in tax rates would  severely reduce the 
incentives for economic activity at a time when the need for maintaining such 
activity  is  the  greatest.  In  this situation, government  debt provides an 
opportunity for the government to  smooth tax rates over time.  Reasons for why 
tax  smoothing generally  is  beneficial, not  only during wars, but  also under 
normal  circumstances,  are  presented  in  Barro  (1979) and  in  Kydland  and 
Prescott (1980b). 
Introducing debt affects neither consumers'  objectives nor  those of the 
government.  The key difference is in the budget constraints.  For the govern- 
ment, consider the following constraint: 
Here, a  stands for  tax  revenue  (the sum of  revenue from  capital and  labor 
t 
taxation and other sources, such as customs duties), 6  is the rate of default 
t 
on the government debt  (say,  because of  inflation), and b  represents govern- 
t 
ment  debt  of  different  maturities,  treated  as  discount  bonds,  with  prices 
given by qt.  We  think of high-powered money  (for example, greenbacks during 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe Civil War) as a form of debt and  include it  in b.  The notation is as 
follows. Let  b  be the amount of debt maturing in period s that is outstand- 
st 
ing as of the beginning of period t, and let eqt be  its corresponding price. 
Define  the  notation qtSbt  = f  q  b-  s=t+l s t e t  practice,  the quantities  b 
st 
usually will equal zero if s is large enough.  In the case of a one-period 
bond, for example, the price t+lqt  of new debt issue is determined by 
where r  is the one-period interest rate between period t and t+l, and  is 
t 
the default rate expected to prevail in period t+l. 
The  time  consistency problem  is  that  in  the  absence  of  a  commitment 
mechanism.  the government in period  t+l  would  like to  default  to  a greater 
extent than what the original plan specifies.  Such default reduces the need 
for distortionary taxes, but  also affects expectations of future defaults and 
therefore the price q at which the public is willing to hold government debt. 
In  Prescott  (19771, for example.  the  government finances a given stream of 
expenditures either through taxes on labor  income  (abstracting from capital) 
or  by  selling debt. For that  model.  he finds that  if  the government has no 
commitment mechanism for future actions. the government will always default on 
outstanding debt  to  avoid  levying distorting taxes.  As  a consequence, the 
equilibrium  implies that  the  value  of  government debt  is zero and  that  the 
government always runs a balanced budget.  This policy and the implied alloca- 
tion are, of course, inferior to the Ramsey allocation for that model. 
Some recent papers investigate circumstances under which Ramsey policies 
are  sustainable in  the  sense of  being  an  equilibrium  arising  endogenously 
within the environment considered.  Chari and Kehoe (1989, 1990) have studied 
this issue for situations in which time-consistency problems can arise either 
because of capital taxation or because of the presence of government debt.  A 
well-written overview  is  in  Chari  (1988).  The  typical  finding  is  that  a 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmRamsey  allocation is problematic  to  implement when  the horizon  is finite. 
When the horizon is infinite, on the other hand, the Ramsey allocation may be 
one among a large, usually infinite, number of equilibriums.  The conditions 
that  have  been  used  to  achieve  this  result  restrict  the  applicability 
severely.  What supports Ramsey policies as equilibriums in those cases is the 
belief by consumers that as long as the government has chosen Ramsey policies 
5  in the past, it will continue to do so. 
To overcome  the  shortcomings associated with  a  lack  of  an endogenous 
comrni  tment mechanism, society in some cases has instituted commitment in the 
form of  laws.  Such  is  the case with  patent protection.  The  law ensures 
sufficient incentives for inventive activity by  allowing firms the exclusive 
use of new inventions for a period of time without fear that the government 
will remove the patent right and allow the price of the product to be driven 
toward the competitive price.  Our thesis is that, although the gold standard 
is  easier  to  change  than.  for  example, the patent  law,  this  institutional 
arrangement has the potentlal for working as an explicit, transparent, well- 
understood rule. 
In an uncertaln world, the Ramsey plan generally would  be  a contingent 
plan or  rule.  Strictly speaklng, in a realistic environment the Ramsey plan 
would Include many contlngencles, some of which may  make little difference to 
soclety's welfare.  In the patent case, one can imagine that an optimal patent 
arrangement occaslonally, under speclal circumstances, would permit nonexclu- 
slve use.  Drawbacks of  includlng many  contlngeneies, however, are lack of 
transparency and posslble uncertalnty among the public regarding the will  to 
obey the orlginal plan.  Thus, a practlcal rule may  include only the contin- 
gency that  is consldered most  Important.  In this sense, it does not quite 
reach the maxlmum of  the  social welfare  functlon, but  will  score high.  By 
discretion, then, we mean any purposeful deviation, under whatever guise, from 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsuch a rule.  The excuse for such a deviation could be a "bad outcome," in the 
language of Grossman and van Huyck  (19881, that is not included as a contin- 
gency  in the original plan.  Deviations are tempting because of  their  imrne- 
diate benefits  (perhaps accompanied by  promises not  to  repeat the breach of 
the rule).  Because of the effect on future beliefs, however, these benefits 
are outweighed by  the long-run implications of having given up on the origin- 
al, nearly optimal, rule. 
The Gold Standard 
The essence of the gold-standard rule is that each country would define 
the  price of gold  in  terms of  its currency and  keep the price fixed.  This 
involves defining a gold coin as a fixed weight of gold called, for example, 
one dollar.  The dollar in 1792 was defined as 24.75 grains of gold with 480 
grains to  the ounce, equivalent to 919.39 per ounce.  The monetary authority 
was then committed to keep the mint price of gold fixed through the purchase 
and  sale of gold in unlimited amounts.  The monetary authority was willing to 
convert into coin gold bullion brought to  it  by  the public, to charge a cer- 
tain fee for the service -- called brassage -- and  also to sell coins freely 
to  the public in any amount and allow the public to convert them into bullion 
6  or export them. 
This rule applies to a pure gold  coin standard.  In fact, the standard 
that prevailed in the nineteenth century was a mixed  standard containing both 
fiduciary money and gold coins.  Under  the mixed  standard, the gold-standard 
rule required that fiduciary money  (issued either by  private banks or by  the 
government) be freely convertible into gold at the fixed price. 
Most countries, until  the  third quarter of  the nineteenth century, main- 
tained bimetallic systems using both gold and silver at a fixed ratio.  Defin- 
ing the weight of both gold and silver coins, freely buying and selling them, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmand maintaining the ratio fixed can be viewed as a variant of the basic gold- 
standard rule, since it  is a fixed value of the unit of account that is the 
7  essence of the rule. 
A  variant  of  the  gold-standard  rule  that  we  believe  is particularly 
pertinent applies to the case of a war.  Assume for the moment that a country 
finds the gold-standard  rule  to have good  operating characteristics if  the 
gold standard is maintained under all circumstances except for a war.  Let zt 
equal one if the country is on the gold standard at time t and zero otherwise. 
Let h  represent the start of war  i  and el its end.  A reasonable rule could 
1 
be  to  choose z =  0 if  t~[h  ,e  +dl  for all i and zt  =  1 otherwise; in other 
t  11 
words, it is understood that  in order to  finance the war, the gold  standard 
will be suspended for the duration of the war plus a delay period d, which is 
the same in every war.  Such a policy, if  implemented as planned, is consis- 
tent with a gold-standard rule.  It  is clear that when people foresee a war in 
the near future, this rule will result in different prices q  for the issue of 
t 
new debt  than under  the  unconditional zt  =  1  rule.  These effects would  be 
regarded  as negative, although  they  presumably  would  be  outweighed by  the 
benefits of being better able to finance the war. 
Thls description  is  consistent  with  the  results of  Lucas  and  Stokey 
(1983),  In whlch financlng of  wars Is a contingency rule that  is optimal in 
one of thelr environments.  In  thelr example, where the occurrence and dura- 
tlon of  the war  are uncertain,  the optlrnal  plan  is for  the debt  not to be 
servlced during a war.  Under  thls pollcy, people realize when they purchase 
the debt that effectively it wlll be defaulted on in the event the war contin- 
ues.  Under the rule, the soverelgn rnalntains the standard -- keeps fixed the 
price of its currency in terms of gold -- except in the event of a major war, 
in which circumstance it can suspend specie payments and issue paper money to 
finance its expenditures, and It can sell debt issues in terms of the nominal 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmvalue of its currency on the understanding that the debt will eventually be 
paid off in gold.  The rule is contingent in the sense that the public under- 
stands that  the suspension will  last only for  the duration of  the wartime 
emergency  plus  some period  of  adJustment; it  assumes that, afterward,  the 
government will follow the deflationary policies necessary to resume payments. 
In this situation, an example of discretion is, after war i has ended, to 
decide at  time  el+d to  delay  further the  resumption of  the gold  standard, 
perhaps as a result of the perceived current situation in terms of the frac- 
tion of the war that has been paid for and the undesirable effects of alterna- 
tive means of financing, such as by  raising taxes.  This change is all  the 
more tempting if the public had accepted the debt at a reasonably high price q 
in the expectation that  the gold standard would be resumed as scheduled.  If 
the government breaks the rule by effectively choosing a high default rate 6 
in the future, it  is obvious that, should there be another war within memory 
of the previous one, then people's behavior would be quite different from that 
in the previous war, even if  the situation is otherwise similar and  the gov- 
ernment claims to subscribe to the same fixed-delay rule. 
Finally, a  second  contingency aspect  of  the  rule  could  arise  during 
financial crises.  Temporary restrictions on convertibility of bank  liabili- 
ties could be used to reduce the extent of a banking panic. 
Comnitment Mechanisms 
How was the gold-standard rule enforced?  One possible explanation focus- 
es on reputational considerations within each country.  Long-run adherence to 
the rule was based  on the historical evolution of  the gold  standard  itself. 
Gold was accepted as money because of  its intrinsic value and desirable prop- 
erties such as durability, storabili  ty, divisibility, portability, and unl- 
formity.  Paper claims,  developed to economize on the scarce resources tied up 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmin commodity money, became acceptable only because they were convertible into 
8  gold. 
In turn, the reputation of the gold standard would constrain the monetary 
authorities from breaching convertibility, except under well-understood  con- 
tingencies.  Thus, when an emergency occurred, the abandonment of the standard 
would be viewed by  all to be a temporary event since, from their experience, 
only gold or gold-backed claims truly served as money. 
An alternative commitment mechanism was to guarantee gold convertibility 
in  the  constitution.  This was  the  case  in Sweden before  1914, where  laws 
pertaining to the gold standard could be changed only by two identical parlia- 
mentary decisions with an election in between (Jonung [1984], p.  368). 
With respect to outright suspension of convertibility, it is difficult to 
distinguish between a suspension as part of the operation of a contingent rule 
as mentioned  above, or  as evidence  of  a change  in  regime.  As  we  discuss 
below, statements by the monetary authorities, debates in Parliament, frequen- 
cy  of  suspension, and changes in expectations as reflected  in people's  deci- 
sions all can be used to distinguish between the two. 
Technical Adjustments, or Opportunity for Discretion? 
There are some aspects of  the operation of a gold  standard that are not 
so clear-cut.  In designing  its details  (for example, the gold-silver ratio 
under bimetallism -- a variant of  the gold standard),  it can be difficult to 
anticipate exactly what  the  optimal  ratio  is.  New knowledge may  be  gained 
over time that would have been helpful when the standard was designed.  When 
the  new  information  is  revealed, a  potentially  difficult question  is what 
happens if the government goes ahead and makes the technical adJustment in the 
standard.  If most people accept the claim that new information is the reason 
for the change, then the associated private behavior should be  approximately 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe same as if  this had been  the standard from the very beginning.  On  the 
other  hand, the  greater  the  suspicion among  the public  that  the  change is 
partly a form of discretion, for which the government certainly has a strong 
incentive, the greater will be  the change in private behavior reflecting the 
adjustment in the public's  beliefs about likely future discretionary actions 
by  the government.  The same argument can be  made regarding the choice of a 
different  price  when  the  gold  standard  is  resumed  after  a  temporary 
9  abandonment. 
An  International Rule 
The gold-standard rule also has an international dimension.  Under  the 
rule, there  would  be  no  restriction on the  nationality of  individuals who 
presented bullion to the mint to be coined, or who exported coin or bullion to 
foreign countries.  Moreover, because every country following the rule fixed 
the  price of  its currency in  gold, this created a system of  fixed exchange, 
rates linking all countries on the same standard.  The international aspect of 
the gold  standard may  have been.  particularly important to  the countries that 
were  relatively  less developed and  therefore depended  on access to  interna- 
tional debt markets.  The thesis of  this paper, however, is that the essence 
of  the  gold-standard  rule was  as a domestic  commitment mechanism.  To  the 
extent  that  the  commitment was honored  in  relation to  other countries, this 
served to strengthen the credibility of the domestic commitment. 
10 
An aspect of the international gold standard given considerable attention 
in  the  literature is  the operation of  the "rules of  the game." According  to 
the traditional story, central banks or the monetary authorities were supposed 
to  use their monetary policy to  speed up the adjustment mechanism to a change 
in external balance.  To the extent the "rules"  would be  followed, this pre- 
sumably would strengthen the commitment to convertibility. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe enforcement of the international gold standard seems to have taken a 
particular form that was conducive to making  it  credible.  A key factor may 
have been the role of England -- the leading financial and commercial center 
of the gold-standard era.  The financial institutions of London provided the 
world with a well-defined and universally accepted means, based  on gold, of 
executing bilateral trades and obtaining credit.  As we shall argue later, the 
gold standard provided England with the necessary benefits to enforce it and 
for many other countries to follow England's  lead.  Exchange in both goods and 
capital was facilitated if  countries adhered  to a standard based  on a rule 
anchored  by  the  same commitment mechanism.  This arrangement may  also have 
contributed to making the commitment mechanism a transparent one, a condition 
that we think is important for its likely success. 
111. History of the Cold Standard as a  Rule 
In  this  section.  we  discuss  the history  of  the  gold  standard, viewed 
first as a domestic rule binding the monetary authorities.  In this context, 
we survey in some detail  the operation of  the gold standard as a contingent 
rule  in  four  countries: England  and  the  U.S.  --  two key nations under  the 
standard; and France and Italy -- the former a "core"  country of the classical 
11  gold standard, the latter an important peripheral country.  We also summarize 
briefly the gold-standard experience of other countries.  Then, we survey the 
record of the gold standard as an international rule governing the interrela- 
tionships between nations. 
Our survey extends primarily from the early nineteenth century to 1933, 
with the main focus on the classical period ending in 1914.  Although the U.S. 
continued to maintain gold backing for the dollar until  1971 and although the 
Bretton Woods system from 1945 to 1971 was based in part on gold, we view the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmperiod after World War I1 as  far enough removed from the gold-standard rule to 
12  be omitted from this survey. 
1.  The  Gold  Standard  as a  Domestic  Rule 
England can be viewed as the most  important country to follow the gold- 
standard rule.  The gold standard in England, as in other Western European 
countries, evolved from the use of a commodity as money.  Standardization of 
coins of specific weight evolved by  the early eighteenth century from a rudi- 
mentary  bimetallic  specie  standard  where  coins  frequently  circulated  by 
weight, not tale (face value).13  England adopted a de facto gold standard in 
1717, after having been on a de facto silver standard at least back  to the 
thirteenth century.  Over the 500-year period on silver, the price of silver 
and  the bimetallic ratio were rarely changed -- the principal exception being 
the  Great Debasement of  the  sixteenth century.  According  to  Glassman and 
Redish  (1988).  this episode represented an attempt to gain seigniorage --  to 
follow  discretionary policy  --  rather  than a  technical adjustment  in  the 
14  coinage. 
The early standard was plagued by  the problems of deterioration in qual- 
ity  and  counterfeiting.  This was  especially  serious for small-denomination 
silver coins and may explain periodic recoinage and occasional debasement in 
the  early  modern  era  (Glassman and  Redish  [19881).  The  emergence of  the 
standard in  its modern guise  likely reflects the development of milling and 
other techniques of producing high-quality coin.  The gold standard emerged in 
England de facto by the unintended overvaluation of gold at the mint from 1717 
by the Master of the Mint, Sir Isaac Newton.  It became de jure in 1816. 
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The gold  standard prevailed, with  the price of gold fixed at t3.85 per 
ounce, from 1717 to 1931,  with two major departures:  1797-1821 and 1914-1925. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe first  departure, referred  to  as the  "Suspension Period"  or  the  "Paper 
Pound" during the Napoleonic wars, is generally viewed as an example of the 
operation of a contingent rule (Barro 119871).  The suspension of payments on 
February 26, 1797, whereby  the Bank  of England received permission from the 
government not to have to redeem its notes in terms of gold, followed a run on 
the country banks and the depletion of the Bank of England's gold reserve with 
16  the threat of a French invasion.  Figure 1 portrays monthly movements in the 
price  of  the  pound  in  terms  of  the  Hamburg  Schillingen  Banco,  the  only 
exchange-rate series continuously available over the entire period.  (The par 
17  of exchange before suspension was approximately 35.) 
The  suspension was  universally  viewed  as a  temporary event, initially 
18  expected  to  last  for a period  of  months.  As  the French wars dragged on, 
however, and  the Bank  of England freely discounted government securities to 
finance military expenditures, the pound  depreciated on the foreign exchange 
market.  Consequently, the  Bank  repeatedly  requested  an  extension  of  the 
suspension.  Concern about  the  depreciation of  the  paper  pound  led  to  the 
Bullion Report  of  1810, which  attributed  the  depreciation  to  the  Bank  of 
England's note issue. 
The Bullion Report recommended that  immediate steps be  taken to  resume 
payments in  two years from the date of  the report at  the presuspension par- 
19  i  ty.  The debate that ensued  in Parliament and  in the press revolved around 
the themes of the extent, if any, of depreciation, and  responsibility for the 
depreciation --  the  Bank  of  England  blaming  it  on external  real  factors. 
20 
There was little discussion of  the possibility of not resuming payments or of 
resuming at a depreciated level of  the pound  in the ensuing 10 years. 
Despite the government'  s opposition to  resumption during wartime condi- 
tions, there exists considerable evidence that  the government wished  to  con- 
firm its commitment to  a return to  the gold  standard once hostilities ceased 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm(Bordo and  White  [  1991  1 1. 21  Several attempts were made  to pick  a date  for 
resumption (1816, 18181, but as each occasion approached, the Bank requested a 
postponement on the grounds that the exchanges were unfavorable.  It is lmpor- 
tant  to note that  this occurred after the wartlme emergency ended  In 1815.22 
Finally,  Parliament  agreed  on  July 2,  1819  (Peel's  Act)  on  resumption  in 
stages from February 1,  1820,  to full redemption on demand on May 1,  1823,  23 
and  it was agreed that the government would retire its outstanding securities 
held by  the Bank and the Bank would reduce its note issue to achieve the aim. 
During  the  year  preceding  resumption,  considerable opposition  to  the  plan 
emerged in Parliament by  interests (especially agriculture and the Birmingham 
industrial  area) hurt  by  deflation.  They  advocated  return  to  parity  at  a 
depreciated pound.  This opposition was not  sufficient, however,  to prevent 
resumption  from  being  achieved  (Feavearyear  (19631,  pp.  224-225;  Fetter 
[ 1965  1,  pp.  73-76; Laidler  [ 19871  1. 
We  interpret the repeated requests for postponement, especially after the 
24  end  of  hostilities in  1815, as the use of discretionary policy.  Moreover, 
each  postponement  gave a negative signal  to  the public  of  the  government's 
intention  of  ever  resuming.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  resumption  was 
achieved suggests that observing the rule was paramount. 
Evidence for  the credibility of  the commitment  to  the gold standard  in 
the Napoleonic War  is provided  in Bordo and White  (1990).  There it  is shown 
that  although the British government pursued  a policy  of tax smoothing (set- 
ting  tax  rates over  time  so  as  to  minimize  deadweight  losses),  it  did  not 
follow a policy  of  revenue smoothing  (smoothing revenue from both  taxes and 
seigniorage  1.  These  results  suggest  that,  a1  though  specie  payments  were 
suspended. the commitment to resume prevented the government from acting as it 
would under a pure fiat regime. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe Bank Charter Act  of 1844 and the separation of the Bank of England, 
into the Issue department to regulate the currency and the Banking department 
to follow sound commercial banking principles, further demonstrated England's 
commitment to  the gold-standard rule.  The  Issue department, by  varying di- 
rectly its fiduciary issue (over and above a statutory limit of C14 million) 
with the  level of gold reserves ("the currency principle"  ),  was designed to 
make the long-run maintenance of the (mixed) gold standard more credible. 
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A  second  contingency  aspect  of  the  rule developed  with  experience  of 
financial crises.  Restrictions on convertibility of bank liabilities for gold 
were used to reduce the extent of a banking panic.  The Bank was authorized to 
expand  its  unbacked  note  issue  in  the  face of  a depletion of  its reserves 
without suspending convertibility of its notes into gold. 
From  1821  to  1914,  the  gold-standard  rule  was  continuously  honored. 
However, on  three  occasions --  the  crises of  1847, 1857, and  1866 --  the 
second contingent aspect of the rule came into play.  The policy was success- 
ful in alleviating the pressure, and the Bank retired the excess issue shortly 
26  thereafter. 
The  Overend  Gurney  crisis of  1866  was  the  last  real  financial  crisis 
(that  is.  banking  panic)  in  British  financial  history  (Schwartz  [I9861  ). 
After  that point, the Bank of  England  learned  to  follow Bagehotss  rule --  in 
the  face of both an external and an  internal drain "to lend  freely but  at  a 
penalty rate."  Although Bagehot  intended for the Bank  to use its discretion 
(in the traditional sense) to  avert a financial crisis, it can be argued that 
the  successful  performance  of  the  Bank  as  lender  of  last  resort  actually 
served  to  strengthen the  credibility of  the  Bank's  commitment to  the gold- 
standard rule, because a key threat to  the maintenance of convertibility was 
removed.  Evidence of  the  credibility of  England's  commitment to  the gold- 
standard  rule  is  provided  by  private  short-term  capital  inflows during  the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmincipient crises of 1890 and 1907 (Eichengreen [1989b1). 
The 1914-1925 episode was similar in many respects to the earlier suspen- 
sion period, although the extent of the inflation and the depreciation of the 
pound  were  considerably  greater.  Indeed,  it  appears  that  the  successful 
resumption of 1821 may have been a factor enabling the British to finance an 
even  larger share of the World  War  I  expenditures by  debt  finance and  the 
27  issue of fiat money '(see table 1). 
Figure 2 shows monthly  movements  in  the  dollar-sterling exchange rate 
from 1914 to 1925.  Note that from the beginning of hostilities in August 1914 
until March 1919, the country was still formally on the gold standard, but the 
monetary authorities prevented  conversion and  pegged  the pound  close to  the 
old parity (Crabbe [I9891  1. 
After hostilities ended, the official view in the Cunliffe Report  (1918) 
and  other  documents was  for an  immediate resumption at  the  old  parity  of 
$4.867.  Consequently, the  Bank  of  England  began  following a  deflationary 
policy in early 1920.  The exchange rate was close to parity by  December 1922, 
but resumption was delayed because of unfavorable events on the continent (the 
Germans' refusal to pay  reparations and  the Belgian-French occupation of the 
Ruhr  in 1923).  By  the end  of  1924, the pound  was again close to parity and 
resumption  was  announced  by  Winston  Churchill  in  the  Budget  Speech  of 
April 28, 1925. 
Though the official view  from  1920 to  1925 was  in  favor of resumption, 
and  a key argument made was  the  maintenance 3f credibility by  returning to 
28  gold at the old par,  vociferous opposi.tion  to it was voiced by  J. M. Keynes 
(1925) and  other academics. by  labor  (not thc  official Labor party),  and  by 
industry groups.  Most  of the opposition, however, with the principal excep- 
tion of Keynes, was opposed not  to resumption at  the old parity per se but to 
the deflationary policies used  to attain it. 
29  The successful resumption in 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm1925 and the painful deflation that accompanied it  can be viewed  as evidence 
30  of the British commitment to the gold-standard rule. 
The United States.  1792-1933 
The U.S.  Constitution (Section 8)  gave Congress power over the currency 
--  "to coin money and regulate the value thereof."  The Coinage Act  of 1792 
defined U.S.  coinage as both  gold and  silver.  Thus, the original monetary 
standard was a bimetallic standard.  One dollar was defined as 371.25 grains 
of  silver or 24.75 grains of gold.  This yields a bimetallic ratio of the 
value of gold to silver of 15:  1.  Soon after instituting the 15:  1  ratio, the 
market  rat  io  increased  to  1%:  1.  Consequently, silver became overvalued at 
the mint, gold  became undervalued, and, via  the operation of Gresham's  law, 
the U.S. after a few years was on a de facto silver standard. 
The situation was altered by  a new Coinage Act  in 1834 and  another in 
1837, which changed the bimetallic ratio to  16:  1, presumably in an attempt to 
restore bimetallism.  As  it turned out, gold became overvalued at  the mint, 
silver became undervalued, and the U.S. switched to a de facto gold standard. 
If we interpret periodic adjustment of the bimetallic mint ratio to the market 
ratio as an example of  a  contingent  rule.  and  if  the  public  expects such 
adjustments.  then  the question arises whether  the switch from 15:l  to  16:l 
rather than to 1c:  1 was a mistake or a deliberate use of discretionary poli- 
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cy.  Indeed. O'Leary  (1937)  viewed  this episode as a deliberate attempt by the 
Jacksonians to discredit the Second Bank of the United States.  The resultant 
flood of gold  coins would  obviate the necessity for  its notes.  The Act  of 
1834  was  also passed  at  the  urging  of  the  gold-producing states of South 
Carolina. North Carolina, and Georgia (Friedman [1990al). 
Figure 3  shows the  dollar-pound  exchange rate on an annual basis from 
1792 to 1933.  The market  exchange rate is defined in  terms of gold, so that 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmduring the period when the U.  S. was on a bimetallic standard it  varied, re- 
flecting  changes  in  the  market  bimetallic  ratio, changes  in  the  official 
31  ratio, and other forces in the market for foreign exchange.  As can be seen 
in  the figure, the exchange rate in the bimetallic era before the Civil War 
was much less stable than during the pure gold-standard period, from 1879 to 
1913. 
The fixed price of $20.67 per ounce prevailed from 1837 to 1933 with one 
significant departure -- the Greenback episode in 1862-78.  Figure 4  plots the 
greenback price of  gold over that period.  It  can be viewed  in conjunction 
with the exchange rate in figure 3. 
The Greenback episode, at least at the outset, can be interpreted as the 
operation of a contingent rule.  The federal government originally intended to 
finance its  expenditures through borrowing  and  taxation, but  within a year 
resorted  to  the  issue of  paper  notes.  Under  the  Legal Tender Acts,  these 
notes were issued on the presumption that they would be  convertible, but  the 
date and provisions for convertibility were not specified. 
Shortly after the war, the government made its intentions clear to resume 
payments at the prewar parity  in the Contraction Act  of April 12, 1866, which 
provided for the limited withdrawal of U.S. notes.  Declining prices from 1866 
to  1868  led  to  a public  outcry and  to  repeal of  the  Act  in  February 1868. 
Over the next seven years a fierce debate raged between the hard-money forces 
-- advocates of rapid  resumption --  and  the soft-money forces, some of whom 
were opposed to restoring the gold  standard, others who wanted to restore it 
at  a devalued parity, and  yet  others who  Jcst wanted  to  prevent  any undue 
deflation and allow the economy to grow up to  its money  supply [Unger 119641, 
Sharkey  [19591).  Alternating victories by  the conflicting forces were mani- 
fest in legislation, alternately contracting and expanding the issue of green- 
backs  (the Public Credit Act  of  1869 contracting it, the reissue of $26  mil- 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlion of retired greenbacks in 1873 expanding it) and, in Supreme Court deci- 
sions, initially declaring the Legal Tender Acts unconstitutional (Hepburn vs. 
Griswold, February 1870),  and then reversing the decision (Knox vs.  Lee, May 
1871).  Finally, the decision to resume payments on January 1, 1879, was made 
in the Resumption Act  of 1875, which the lame-duck Republican Congress passed 
by a majority of one.  Despite the announcement of resumption, however, and of 
steps taken by  the Treasury to accumulate a gold reserve and to retire green- 
backs, the bitter election of 1876 was fought between Cooper, the Greenback 
candidate, who was opposed to resumption; Tilden, a soft-money Democrat; and 
Hayes, a hard-money Republican.  Hayes won by one electoral vote.  Yet, had 
Tilden won, according to one authority, resumption would not have been pre- 
vented; only the date may have been changed (Unger [1964], pp. 310-31  1). 
Though the ferocity of the debate and the reversals in policy suggest to 
us  that  many  features of  the  post-Civil  War  period  can be  interpreted  as 
incorporating elements of  a discretionary  regime, other evidence argues  in 
favor of the contingent gold-standard rule.  As Calomiris (1988) points out, 
credibility  in  the  restoration of  the gold-standard  rule was  likely estab- 
lished in 1869 by  the actual redemption of bond  principal in gold by  the Act 
of March 18, 1869, guaranteeing payment  in gold, and the Supreme Court deci- 
sion in Venzie Bank vs.  Fenno, which supported the constitutionality of gold 
32  clauses (Calomiris [ 19881, p.  208fn). 
Moreover,  both  Roll  ( 1972  1  and  Calomir  is  ( 1988)  present  evidence  of 
expected appreciation of the greenback based on a negative interest differen- 
tial  between  bonds  that  were  paid  in  greenbacks and  those  paid  in  gold. 
Calomiris (see table 2)  calculates the appreciation forecast error on a semi- 
annual  basis  from January  1869  to  December  1878, defined  as the difference 
between his calculation of expected appreciation and actual appreciation.  The 
errors are close to zero for most of the periods, with two exceptions: January 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmto June 1869, when the error  is 1.53,  and January to  June 1876, when it  is 
-1.46.  The former positive exchange-rate surprise reflects the credibility of 
the government's  commitment to  the redemption of bond principal  in gold; the 
latter negative surprise reflects the  temporary  threat to  resumption by  the 
election of 1876. 
In  the ensuing 17 years, though the U.S.  was back on a gold basis, the 
battle between hard- and  sof  t-money forces continued over  the  issue of free 
coinage of silver.  Silver advocates can be  classified into several groups. 
There were those who believed  that, had  silver not  been demonetized by  the 
"Crime of 73" (the Coinage Act  of February 1873).  then bimetallism  at  16:1 
would have yielded less deflation than actually occurred from 1873 to 1896, as 
relatively more abundant silver was substituted for increasingly scarce gold. 
Such a position is consistent with maintenance of a rule.  Other silver advo- 
cates (such  as the Populist party),  however, viewed the issue of silver certi- 
ficates as a potential engine of  inflation to stimulate the economy, as well, 
as to reverse the redistribution of income from debtors to creditors.  In this 
sense, the pressure infavor of discretion did not disappear. 
The free-silver forces  succeeded  in  passing  two pieces of  legislation 
that  increased the outstanding stock of silver coins: the Bland Allison Act of 
1878 and  the Sherman Silver Purchase Act  of  1890.  The latter  increased the 
stock of high-powered money sufficiently to  threaten convertibility into gold 
(Friedman and  Schwartz [19631).  As  Crilli  (1989,  figure 3) shows, however, 
the probability of a speculative attack on the gold dollar at the height of 
the  agitation over  silver in  1893  (before the  repeal  of  the  Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act) was not much greater than 6  percent. 
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A second departure from the gold standard, an embargo during World War  I 
(1917-1919) on gold exports, did not  affect  internal convertibility of gold. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmHence, we believe it should be viewed as merely a temporary adJustment in the 
34  standard. 
Financial crises characterized by  banking panics were frequent in U.S. 
monetary  history  until  the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
Before 1914, pressure on the banking system's reserves was often relieved by a 
restriction on convertibility of  bank  notes and  deposits into high-powered 
money.  The restrictions in 1837-1838, 1839, and 1857 did involve suspensions 
of convertibility into gold.  It could be argued, however, that such temporary 
departures were viewed as a contingent aspect of  the rule.  The restrictions 
of 1873, 1893,  and 1907-1908 did not involve suspension of convertibility into 
gold and hence cannot be viewed as breaking the gold-standard rule. 
Franklin Roosevelt's decision to devalue the dollar in 1933 (in order to 
raise  the price  level) represents a  clear departure from the gold-standard 
rule and  a  clear  case of  discretion.  Though  the price  of  gold  was again 
fixed,  at $35 per ounce, gold ownership by U.S. residents was prohibited, and 
the standard that  reemerged has been described as "a discretionary fiduciary 
standard" with gold  just  a  commodity whose price  was  fixed by  an official 
support program (Friedman  and Schwartz [19631). 
France 
France followed a bimetallic  standard from the Middle Ages until  1878. 
From  the  thirteenth  to  the  fifteenth century.  the  rule was honored  in the 
breach more than the observance, with frequent debasements, devaluations, and 
revaluations.  This reflects  internal political  instability, frequent wars, 
and  the lack of an adequate tax  base  (Bordo [ 19861 1.  By the sixteenth cen- 
tury, France had  developed a stable bimetallic system, although the ancient 
regime  was  punctuated  by  several  devaluations  and  revaluations  (Murphy 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm\  [1987]), and the infamous system of John Law -- a paper-money-induced infla- 
tion -- from 1716 to 1720 (Bordo [1987al). 
The French revolution spawned the assignat hyperinflation from 1789 to 
1795 -- the aftermath of which led  to the establishment of official bimetal- 
lism with the fixing of the ratio of silver to gold at 1%:  1 in 1803, a rule 
that was  successful for 75 years  (Bordo and  White  [19911).  Until  the  late 
1840s. abundant supplies of silver threatened to displace gold, but with gold 
discoveries in  California and  Australia  the  process was reversed  until  the 
1860s. when major silver discoveries again threatened the bimetallic standard. 
In 1865, France formed the Latin Monetary Union with Belgium, Switzerland,  and 
Italy (later joined by  the Papal States, Greece, and Romania).  By agreeing to 
mint  silver coins of the same fineness, these countries expanded the size of 
the  bimetallic  currency area.  The Latin Monetary  Union continued the  free 
coinage of silver until, swamped by  massive supplies of new silver from dis- 
coveries in  the  Americas and  by  the  abandonment  of  the  silver  standard  in 
Germany and  other European countries emulating  the  gold-standard  example of 
Britain, the  leading  commercial power  (Friedman [1990bl),  it limited silver 
coinage in 1874 and fully demonetized silver in 1878 (Bordo [1987b1). 
France  followed the  gold-standard  rule  (albeit in  its bimetallic  form 
until  1878) until World War  I.  Figure 5 shows the pound-franc exchange rate 
from  1821  to  1938.  As  can  be  seen, the  rate was very  stable until  1914, 
rarely departing more  than one percentage  in gold  points from the parity of 
25.22 francs  to  the  pound.  France, like  the  other  two  countries  in  this 
period, suspended specie convertibility  in  times of  national emergency.  On 
two  occasions, the  Bank  of  France announced  Cours ForcC  --  the  first from 
March 15, 1848 to  August 6,  1850, following the February 1848 revolution, and 
the second during and  after  the  Franco-Prussian war  from August 12, 1870 to 
January 1, 1878.  It is  interesting to  note that during  these periods, the 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexchange rate varied close to parity.  On  both occasions, the Bank of France 
limited its note issue, acting as if it were constrained by the gold-standard 
rule [Lacroix and Dupieux [19731). 
Like other belligerents  in World  War  I, France switched to  fiat-money 
issue  to  finance  the  war,  intending  to  resume payments  after  hostilities 
ended.  Unlike the British case, the aftermath of the war was a period of 
rapid  inflation and  depreciation of  the  franc.  The  forces of  discretion 
carried the day even with the ultimate return of the franc to gold converti- 
bility  at  a vastly depreciated  level  in  1928.  35  France stayed on the gold 
standard until 1936. 
Italy 
In  contrast to England, France, and  the U.S.,  Italy departed  from the 
gold-standard  rule more  than followed  it.  The newly unified  Italian state 
adopted  a gold  standard  in  1865 but  abandoned  it  in  May  1866 and  did  not 
return  to  convertibility  until  March  1883.  According  to  Fratianni  and 
Spinelli (19841, inconvertibility was a consequence of both financing the war 
against  Austria  in  1866 and  conducting  the government's  subsequent liberal 
fiscal policy. According to Fratiannl and Spinelli, "Politicians  had no diffi- 
culties in throwing off the straitjacket of the gold standard when it  stood in 
the way of largebudget deficits" (p. 419).  A return to sound fiscal policy 
permitted restoration of gold payments from 1883 to February 1894,  after which 
the  Italian  currency remained  inconvertible until  December  1927, when  gold 
36  convertibility was resumed at  a depreciated value of  the lira.  During the 
pre-World  War  I  period, however, the monetary  authorities acted as if  they 
were on the gold  standard.  The exchange rate with France returned close to 
parity in 1903 and remained there until the outbreak of war.  Money growth was 
low, and  the  budget  was  often  in  surplus  (Tonniolo [1990,  p.  1881).  This 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmepisode suggests that commitment to the gold-standard rule was of considerable 
importance to the Italian monetary authorities. 
Evidence for the credibility of the commitment to the gold standard can 
be  seen in the risk premium on Italian government long-term securities rela- 
tive  to  their  French  counterparts over  the  period  1866  to  1912,  shown  in 
37  figure 6.  In  the  first period  of  inconvertibility  (1866-1883).  the  risk 
premium  averaged more  than 2 percent per  year; in  the gold-standard period 
(1884-1894),  it  averaged close to  zero; and  in  the  second  inconvertibility 
period  (1894-1912). it declined from 2  percent in the first half of the period 
to  .5 percent after 1902. 
We  have  described  the  gold-standard experience of four important  coun- 
tries:  three  "core" countries  (England, the U.S., and  France) that  followed 
the gold-standard  rule, and  Italy, a country that, though officially on the 
gold  standard, suspended convertibility more  than half the  time.  One way  to 
summarize  this  experience  is  to  present  evidence  on  the  persistence  of 
inflation. 
Barsky  (1987)  presents evidence for the U.K. and  the U.S. that inflation 
under the gold  standard was very  nearly a white-noise process.  This is com- 
pared  to  the  post-World  War  I1  period,  when  the  inflation rate  exhibited 
considerable persistence.  Evidence for  the  absence of  inflation persistence 
does not prove  that  countries followed the gold-standard rule.  It  is,  how- 
ever, not inconsistent with the suggestion that market agents expect that the 
monetary authorities will not continuously follow an inflationary policy -- an 
expectation that is also consistent with belief in following a convertibility 
rule. 
To  develop  this  further, following  Barsky's  approach,  we  examine  in 
table 3  the autocorrelations of inflation using annual wholesale price indices 
for the four countries for different periods covering the entire gold-standard 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexperience.  The results in table 3 confirm those of Barsky.  Inflation in all 
four countries was very nearly white noise, as seen in the  low autocorrela- 
tions.  These results hold  for different subperiods when the  countries con- 
cerned  followed the  bimetallic variant  of  the  rule and  for subperiods when 
they departed from convertibility following the contingent aspect of the rule. 
As did Klein (1975) and Barsky (19871, we observe negative serial correlation 
38  at  a number  of  lags in all  the  subperiods.  This  is consistent with  the 
commodity money adjustment mechanism of the gold standard discussed by Rockoff 
(1984) and Barsky and Summers (1988).  The 9-statistics, which test the joint 
hypothesis that the first n autocorrelations are all zero for specified n, do 
not  reject the white-noise hypothesis for any of the  subperiods.  Over  the 
entire period  1730 to 1938 for the U.  K.  and  the entire periods 1793 to  1913 
and  1793 to  1933 for the U.S.. however.  the hypothesis is rejected at  the 5 
percent significance level.  These periods represent conglomerates of differ- 
ent regimes that had different mean rates of inflation.  Aggregation then may 
induce serial correlation. 
We also tested for a unit root in the inflation series using the Dickey- 
Fuller test.  In only one episode --  the U.S.,  1862 to  1878 -- could one be 
detected  at  the  10 percent  significance level.  In  sum, we  interpret  this 
evidence as consistent with agents' beliefs in the credibility of the commit- 
ment to  the gold-standard convertibility rule.  Because the power of the tests 
is admittedly low, however, this evidence is only suggestive. 
A number of other countries followed the gold-standard rule until 1914 as 
39  strictly as the three core countries just discussed.  These include Germany 
(the fourth  "core" country), the  Scandinavian  countries, and  the  British 
Dominions.  The latter two sets of countries, like England, returned to gold 
at  the original parity in the mid-1920s.  A  number of countries that were not 
formally on the gold  standard  acted  as  if  they  were, by  maintaining  price 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmlevels as stable as the gold-standard countries.  These include Spain and the 
Austro-Hungarian  empire before  1892.  Finally, a number of  countries, most 
notably Argentina, followed the example of Italy by alternately following and 
then abandoning gold convertibility during the period of falling prices, 1880 
to 1900. and of rising prices, 1900 to 1913 (Ford [I9621  1. 
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2.  The Cold Standard as an International Rule 
The classical gold standard emerged as a true international standard by 
1880  following the  switch by  the  majority  of  countries from  bimetallism, 
41  silver monometallism, and paper to gold as the basis of their currencies.  As 
an international standard, the key rule was maintenance of gold convertibility 
at the established par.  Maintenance of a fixed price of gold by its adherents 
in turn ensured fixed exchange rates.  Recent evidence suggests that, indeed, 
exchange rates throughout the 1880 to 1914  period were characterized by a high 
degree of fixity in the principal countries.  Although exchange rates fre- 
quently deviated from par, violations of the gold  points were rare  (Officer 
[19861), as were devaluations (Eichengreen [19851). 
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The  international gold  standard  was  a  successful  example  of  a  fixed 
exchange-rate system, although gold convertibility is not required to operate 
a fixed exchange-rate system successfully (as is evident from the case of the 
EMS  [Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989111.  The gold-standard rule was primarily a 
domestic rule with an important  international dimension.  This dimension in 
turn may have served to make the domestic gold-standard rule more credible in 
a number of significant ways.  In addition to  the reputation of the domestic 
gold standard and constitutional provisions as discussed in section 11, adher- 
ence to the  international gold-standard rule may  have been enforced by  other 
mechanisms.  These include  improved access to  international capital markets, 
the operation of the rules of the game, and the hegemonic power of England. 
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obtaining access at  favorable terms to  the international capital markets of 
the  "core" countries, especially England and  France.  It was believed  that 
creditors would  view  gold  convertibility as a  signal  of  sound  government 
finance and the future ability to service debt.  This was the case both for 
developing countries wishing  to  have  access  to  long-term  capital,  such as 
Austria-Hungary  (Yeager [I98411 and  Latin America  (Fishlow [19891),  and  for 
countries wishing to finance war expenditures, such as Japan, which financed 
the  Russo-Japanese  war  of  1905-1906 with  foreign  loans  seven years  after 
joining the gold  standard (Hayashi [ 19891  1.  Once on the gold standard. such 
countries feared the consequences of departure.  43  The fact that England, the 
most  successful country of the nineteenth century, as well as other "progres- 
sive" countries were on the gold standard was probably a powerful argument for 
joining (Gallarotti [19911, Friedman [1990bl). 
The operation of  the "rules of  the game," whereby the monetary authori- 
ties were supposed to alter the discount rate to speed up the adjustment to a 
change in external balance, may also have been an important part of the com- 
mitment mechanism to the international gold-standard rule.  Thus, for example, 
when a country was running a balance-of-payments  deficit and there was a gold 
outflow, the monetary authority,  observing a decline in its gold reserves, was 
supposed to  raise its discount rate in  order to  reduce domestic credit.  The 
resultant drop in the money supply would  reduce the price level.  The adjust- 
ment  process  would  be  aided  by  higher  short-term domestic  interest  rates 
attracting capital from abroad.  To the extent the "rules"  would be  followed 
and adjustment facilitated, this would  strengthen the commitment to converti- 
bility, as conditions conduclve to  abandonment would be  lessened. 
There exists considerable evidence on the operation of the "rules of the 
game."  Bloomfield  (19591, in a classic study, showed that, with the principal 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexception of England, the  rules were frequently violated  in  the  sense  that 
discount rates were not always changed in the required direction (or by suffi- 
cient amounts) and  in  the sense that  changes in domestic  credit were of  ten 
44  negatively correlated with changes in gold reserves.  In addition, a number 
45  of countries used gold devices -- practices to  prevent gold from leaving. 
According  to Goodfriend  (19881, central banks operating under the gold stan- 
dard  did  so  to  achieve  "interest rate smoothing" through  the  use  of  gold 
stockpiling.  Such practices, in our approach, could be viewed as a form of 
discretion, because  following  them  could  lead  the  public  to  believe  that 
ultimately convertibility would be abandoned. 
For  the  major  countries, however, at  least  before  1914, such policies 
were not used extensively enough to  threaten the convertibility into gold -- 
evidence for commitment to  the rule (Schwartz (19841).  Moreover, as McKinnon 
( 1992) argues, to  the extent monetary authorities followed Bagehots  s rule and 
prevented  a  financial  crisis  while  seemingly violating  the  "rules of  the 
game," the  commitment  to  the  gold  standard  in  the  long  run may  have  been 
strengthened  . 
An  additional enforcement mechanism  for the  international gold-standard 
rule may  have  been  the hegemonic power  of  England, the most  important gold- 
standard country (Eichengreen [1989al).  A persistent theme in the literature 
on the international gold standard is that the classical gold standard of 1880 
to 1914 was a British-managed standard (Bordo [19841).  Because London was the 
center  for  the  world's  principal  gold,  commodities,  and  capital  markets, 
because of  the extensive outstanding sterling-denominated assets, and because 
many countries used  sterling as an international reserve currency (as a sub- 
stitute for gold), it  is argued that  the Bank of England, by manipulating its 
bank rate, could attract whatever gold  it needed and, furthermore, that other 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmcentral banks would adjust their discount rates accordingly.  Thus, the Bank 
of England  could  exert powerful  influences on the money  supplies and  price 
levels of other gold-standard countries. 
The evidence  suggests that  the  Bank  did  have  some  influence on other 
European central banks (Lindert [196911..  Eichengreen (1987)  views the Bank of 
England as engaged in a leadership role in a Stackelberg strategic game with 
other central banks as followers.  The other central banks accepted a passive 
role because of the benefits to  them of using sterling as a reserve asset. 
According  to  this  interpretation.  the  gold-standard  rule may  have been en- 
46  forced by  the Bankof England.  Thus, the monetaryauthorities of many coun- 
tries  may  have  been  constrained  from  following  independent  discretionary 
policies that would have threatened the adherence to the gold-standard rule. 
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The benefits to England as leader of the gold standard -- from seignio- 
rage  earned  on  foreign-held  sterling balances,  from  returns  to  activities 
generated  by  its central  position  in  the gold  standard, and  from access to 
international capital markets in wartime  -- were substantial enough to make 
the costs of not following the rule extremely high. 
IV. The Lessons from History 
The history of  the gold  standard suggests that  the gold  convertibility 
rule was followed continuously by  only a few key countries -- the best example 
being England from 1821  to  1914.  Most  major  countries, however, did  follow 
the  rule  during  the  heyday  of  the  classical  gold  standard, 1880  to  1914. 
Peripheral countries and several fairly important nations --  Italy and Argen- 
tina --  alternately followed and  then departed from the rule.  but  even they 
were constrained in a looser sense. 
The  gold-standard  rule  also  proved  to  be  successful  as  a  commitment 
mechanism for England, the U.S.,  and France in preventing default on debt and 
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ensuring that paper-money  issues were not permanent.  It may  have been suc- 
cessful as a commitment device because it  had the virtues of being simple and 
transparent. 
We have suggested a number of reasons why the gold-standard rule was so 
successful as a commitment mechanism before 1914.  First, as a contingent rule 
it  permitted nations to have access to revenue in times of wartime emergency. 
The commitment to return to gold parity after the war would enable the author- 
ities to  issue debt and  to  collect seigniorage at  more  favorable terms than 
48  otherwise. 
Second, in England and possibly in other countries, gold emerged early on 
as a way  of  certifying contracts.  This certifying  characteristic  of  gold 
carried  forward  to  the relationship between  the private and  public  sectors. 
Abandoning  gold  convertibility was  viewed  as a serious breach  of  contract. 
The gold standard emerged in the stable political environment of England after 
the seventeenth century, where the rule of law sanctified private contracts. 
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Only a few countries had  comparable stability.  Countries fraught with more 
unstable  internal politics  found  it more  difficult  to  refrain from running 
budget deficits, ultimately financed by  paper money  issue (for example, Italy 
and  Argentina),  although  the  benefits  of  convertibility  placed  some  con- 
50  straints on their behavior. 
The gold standard was also successful as an international rule: By  peg- 
ging their currencies to gold, countries became part of a fixed exchange-rate 
system.  The international aspect of the gold standard may have reinforced the 
domestic  commitment  mechanism  because  of  the  perceived  advantages of  more  . 
favorable access to  international  capital  markets, by  the  operation of  the 
"rules  of the game,"  and by  the importance of England as a hegemonic power. 
The advantages accruing  to  England  as the  center of  the gold-standard 
world -- the use of sterling as a reserve asset and the location in London of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe world's key asset and commodity markets -- made the costs of not following 
the gold-standard rule (except in wartime emergency) extremely high.  Further- 
more, because England was the most  important country in the gold-standard era 
and access to the London capital market was considered to be of great benefit 
to developing countries, it  is likely that many countries adhered to the gold 
standard  that  otherwise would  not  have,  given  the  high  resource  costs of 
maintaining gold reserves.  Also, because of the Bank of England's  leadership 
role, other  central banks may  have  been  prevented  from  using discretionary 
policies, threatening adherence to the rule. 
A  comparison of  the  pre-1914 period  with  the  subsequent period  is of 
great interest.  The gold exchange standard, which prevailed  for only a few 
years from the mid-1920s  to  the Great Depression, was an attempt to  restore 
the assorted features of the classical gold standard while allowing a greater 
role for domestic  stabilization policy.  It  also attempted to economize on 
gold  reserves by  restricting its use to  central banks and by  encouraging the 
use of foreign exchange as a substitute.  As is well known, the gold exchange 
standard suffered from a number of fatal flaws (Kindleberger [1973], Eichen- 
green [19911,  Temin [198911.  These include the use of two reserve currencies, 
the  absence of  leadership by  a hegemonic power, the  failure of  cooperation 
between the key members, and  the unwillingness of its two  strongest members, 
the  U.S. and  France, to  follow  the  "rules of  the  game," instead  exerting 
deflationary pressure on the rest of the world by  persistent sterilization of 
balance-of-payment  surpluses.  The  gold  exchange  standard  collapsed,  but 
according  to  Friedman  and  Schwartz  ( 1963  1,  Temin  ( 1989  1,  and  Elchengreen 
(19911,  not before transmitting deflation and depression across the world. 
While  the gold-standard  rule was widely upheld  before  1914, it has not 
been since, although to  a  lesser extent  both  the  short-lived gold  exchange 
standard and  the Bretton Woods system incorporated a number of its features. 
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dard, although rhetoric over the importance of rules abounds.  This may seem 
surprising, since the  benefits  of  having  a  commitment mechanism  seem  more 
relevant today than 100 years ago.  On the other hand, there may have been the 
perception  that government debt was, and  is, less important as an emergency 
source of funds than it was in the gold-standard era.  For example, the stocks 
of physical and human capital have risen substantially.  The time inconsisten- 
cy  literature has  taught  us  that  the  incomes therefrom  have  broadened  the 
scope for policymakers to use discretionary policy.  For example, marginal tax 
rates  for  people  with  above-average human  capital  rose dramatically during 
World War  11.  In the absence of a commitment mechanism, these rates were not 
returned to prewar levels. 
The  gold-standard  rule  was  simple,  transparent, and, for  close  to  a 
century, successful.  Even though  it was characterized by  some defects from 
the  perspective of  macroeconomic  performance, a better  commitment mechanism 
has not  been adopted.  Despite its appeal, many  of  the  conditions that made 
the  gold  standard  so successful  vanished  in  1914, and  the  importance that 
nations  attach  to  immediate  objectives  casts  doubt  on  its  eventual 
restorat  ion. 
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1  For  surveys of  this  literature,  see Bordo  (1984)  and  Eichengreen  (1985, 
1989b  1. 
2  See Bordo (19811,  Cooper (1982).  and Meltzer and Robinson (1989). 
3  For a  discussion of  the Currency Banking School debate, see Viner  (1937), 
Fetter (1965). and Schwartz (1987). 
4 The  following  framework  is  essentially  identical  to  that  in  Kydland  and 
Prescott  (1980a).  Also,  the  main  example  of  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977) 
illustrates time inconsistency in an environment in which tax policy affects 
the incentives for capital accumulation. 
 he idea  that reputation may  support optimal policy  has been  studied  in a 
different context by Barro and Gordon (1983). 
6  Strictly speaking, the government need define a gold  coin only  in  terms of 
the unit  of  account.  Private mints could  then  supply the demand for coin. 
Indeed,  this  was  the  case  shortly  after  the  California  gold  discoveries 
(Bancroft  [18901, p.  165 1.  In most  countries, however, the mint  was under 
government authority. 
7  Viewed, however. as a rule in the traditional sense --  as an automatic mech- 
anism to ensure price stability -- bimetallism may have had greater scope for 
automaticity than  the gold  standard because  of  the  additional cushion of a 
switch from one metal  to  the  other.  See Friedman  (1990b).  Garber  (1986) 
regards bimetalllsm as a gold standard with an option. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI  'Goodfriend  (1989) describes how the evolution of contractual arrangements in 
the  financial  system  in  eighteenth-  and  nineteenth-century  England  had  to 
overcome the problem of fraud.  Private markets developed an elaborate system 
of monitoring financial arrangements, but ultimately convertibility into gold 
lay behind them. 
'A.  additional source of discretion was government policies to regulate gold 
production, such as taxation, the enforcement and relaxation of environmental 
regulations, and subsidies to encourage gold production in periods of depres- 
sion.  For examples of the use of such policies, see Rockoff  (1984, pp.  632- 
639  1. 
10 The role of spillover effects on reputation through multiple relationships is 
discussed in Cole and Kehoe (1991). 
11  We  do not  include Germany, the fourth "core" country of  the classical gold 
standard, in  the survey because  its history as a unified nation on the gold 
standard -- from 1871  to  1914 -- did not  include a period  of contingent sus- 
pension of payments (McGouldrick [198411. 
12  See Bordo (19911.  McKinnon (19921,  however, views the Bretton Woods system as 
a dollar standard with a set of rules that  incorporated many of the features 
of the classical gold standard. 
13  Even under the pre-1914 gold  standard, however, weight mattered  for sover- 
eigns. Bankers had  tiny scales for weighing sovereigns, which might be credit- 
ed  at  less than 20 shillings.  Loss on light gold was clearly a consideration 
for George Rae, himself a leading banker at  the time, in The Country Banker, 
1885, Letter XIX.  (Our thanks  to  Leslie Presnell  for bringing  this to  our 
attention.  1 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm14~y  contrast to England, monetary authorities in medieval France and Burgundy 
often would change arbitrarily the face value of silver coins to raise revenue 
-- a discretionary breach of the rule, a policy that would succeed until the 
public  caught  on,  raising prices  in  proportion  to  the  change  in unit  of 
account. 
150ne  interpretation of  England's  early  abandonment  of  bimetallism  is  the 
continuous difficulties encountered in providing a fractional silver coinage 
(Redish [ 19901  1.  Alternatively, Lord Liverpool'  s decision to adopt gold may 
have been strongly influenced by Ricardo's  (1819)  belief that technical change 
in silver mining would  lead to  a massive increase in its supply. See Friedman 
( 1990b). 
16~hough  the Bank of England was a private institution until 1946,  we treat its 
policies as not  independent of  the wishes of the government.  The government 
had  two  powerful checks over the Bank:  periodic renewal of  its charter, and 
its  role  as the  government's banker.  For  a contrary view,  see Gallarotti 
(1991). 
17  In interpreting this exchange rate, adjustments must be made to allow for the 
Hamburg currency being  on silver and  sterling being  effectively on gold, as 
well as the  interest charge implicit  in  the  prices of bills of exchange used 
to  derive the  series.  As  Ricardo pointed  out, when  these factors are taken 
into  account, the  Hamburg exchange rate understated  the depreciation of  the 
Bank of England note in terms of  gold  (Fetter [19651,  p. 28). 
18  The Order in Council of February 26, suspending the specie convertibility of 
Bank of England notes, recommended resumption by June 24, 1797. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm19  The report's exact words were: 
".  .  .Your  Committee  would  suggest,  that  the  restriction  on  cash 
payments  cannot  safely be  removed at  an  earlier  period  than  two 
years from the present time; but your Committee is of the opinion 
that early provision ought to be made by parliament for terminating, 
by  the  end  of  the  period, the  operation of  the  several  statutes 
which have imposed and continued that restriction." Report from the 
Select Committee on the High Price of Bullion (1978),  [1810,cclxi] 
It went  on to  stress that, even  if  peace  came in less than two years, two 
years should be allowed for resumption because of the increase likely, both in 
mercantile activity on the coming of peace, and  in demands on the Bank  for 
discount.  But.  "even if the war should be prolonged, cash payments should be 
resumed by  the end of that period  [of two years from the date of the Report]." 
[ibidl 
20  The "Bullionist  debate" pitted  the Bullionists, who blamed  the depreciation 
of  the pound  on the  excessive  issue  of  Bank  of  England notes, against  the 
anti-Bullionists, who  attributed  the  depreciation  to  extraordinary wartime 
foreign remittances and  other  real  factors.  See Laidler  [1987) and  Viner 
(1937). 
21  The government's failure to  confront the Bullion Report's criticism directly 
can be understood  in this  light.  The government felt unable to argue that 
continued  suspension was  justified  by  wartime  fiscal  needs because  it  was 
concerned  that  this position would  weaken both  internal and  external confi- 
dence  in  the  paper  pound.  Instead.  the  government  took  the  much maligned 
position of both disputing the facts of depreciation and presenting a list of 
nonmonetary causes (O'Brien 119671, Chapter 6). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm22~ccording  to Neal  (19911, the Bank was opposed to resumption after hostili- 
ties ceased because it  feared the  loss of  its gold reserves as capital was 
repatriated to the continent. 
23  Initially, resumption would be at C4, 15s. Od on gold bars.  The price would 
then be  reduced in stages and  the terms extended finally to  include coin at 
mint par of C3, 17s, 1e  (Clapham 119441, p.  71). 
24~lthough  one could argue that the war did not really end until reparations 
were paid and the Allies ended their occupation of France in 1818.  See White 
(1991). 
25 The Bank Charter Act was criticized on two grounds:  (1) the currency princi- 
ple ignored the role of deposits as an increasingly important component of the 
money  stock; and  (2)  the Banking Department, in operating on a sound commer- 
cial banking basis, could not act responsibly as a central bank.  The latter 
criticism was at  the heart  of  the  traditional  case for  "discretion."  This 
criticism culminated in the 1860s with  the formulation by Walter Bagehot, the 
influential editor of The Economist, of  the  "responsibility doctrine" and the 
establishment of guidelines for a central bank  under  a gold  standard  (Bordo 
[19841,  pp. 45-46). 
26  On  all  three occasions, the  Treasury  issued  a letter allowing the  Bank  to 
expand  its fiduciary issue, but  only in  1857 did  it actually do so.  On the 
other two occasions, the announcement alone was sufficient to allay the panic 
(Clapham [1944], Vol.  11, pp. 208-209). 
27  The contribution of high-powered money to  the finance of wartime expenditure 
is a lower-bound estimate of  the  contribution of  money  to  wartime  finance, 
since in both episodes the banking system participated in the operation. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI  28~ccording  to Moggridge  (1969), the key reason cited was the maintenance of 
London's prominent position in international finance. 
29  See  Pollard  (1970,  editor's  introduction),  and  especially  Brown  (1929), 
Sayers (19601, and Hume (1963). 
?3nith  and Smith (1990) view resumption in 1925 as  an example of a stochastic- 
process  switch.  Their numerical estimates  suggest  that,  contrary  to  some 
contemporary views, the appreciation of  sterling prior  to April  1925 appears 
to have been due to fundamentals, such as restrictive monetary policy, rather 
than to the expectation of a change in regime. 
31  See Officer (1983, 1985) for a valuable discussion on measuring both the par 
of exchange and the market exchange rate. 
32  According to Calomiris (19881,  following Mitchell (1903)  and Roll (1972),  the 
pace  and  timing of  resumption depended solely on fiscal news --  legislation 
and  pol  icy  announcements  affecting  the  government'  s  budget  .  Rolnick  and 
Wallace  (1984) also view interpretation of this episode as dependent only on 
overall government fiscal expectations. 
33  Garber and Grilli  (1986) present estimates of silver risk in the yields of 
dollar-denominated assets in  this period.  Also  see Garber  (1986) for esti- 
mates of the value of the silver option on bimetallic bonds. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm34  The U.  S.  . unlike the British example comparing World  War  I to  the French 
Wars, did not finance a larger fraction of its expenditures in World War I by 
debt and fiat money issue than in the Civil War.  The fractions are: 
A.  Civil War 1861-1865  B.  World War I 1917-1918 
Percent of  Percent of 
wartime expenditure  wartime expenditure 
financed by:  financed by: 
(1)  Taxes  21 
(2)  Bonds  6  1 
(3)  High-powered Money  18 
Sources:  1861-1865: Friedman ( 1952  1. 
1917-1918: Walton and Rockoff (19891,  p.  443. 
35  According  to  Eichengreen  (19911, following Alesina  and  Drazen  (1989),  the 
rapid inflation in the early 1920s and the de facto stabilization of the franc 
at an undervalued rate in 1926  reflected a compromise outcome from a war  of 
attrition between debtors and creditors.  By contrast, Britain's return to the 
old parity represented a victory by the creditor class. 
36  This did not occur until after wartime inflation was in  large part reversed 
by Mussolini's contractionary policies.  See Kindleberger (1984).  p.  383. 
37  Following Fratianni and Spinelli  (19841,  we calculate the country risk pre- 
mium  as  Dt = h  (l+i~,t)  - h  (l+i~,t)  - h E:+(  + !.n  Et,  where  it  is  the 
yield on  Italian bonds at  time  t;  iFSt  is the yield on French bonds, E:+,  is 
the lira-franc exchange rate  for  t+l  expected at  t,  and Et is the exchange 
rate at  t.  Their calculation holds constant transactions costs and assumes 
perfect foresight in the exchange market, that  is. h E:+~  = h Et+1.  We also 
calculated  the  risk  premium  using  an  alternative measure  of  the  expected 
change  in  the  exchange  rate, h Et - h Et-(,  and  the  picture was virtually 
the same. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmI  '8Klein  (1975) also presents evidence for mean reversion of  the price  level 
under the gold standard. 
39  See Bordo and Kydland (1990) for a more detailed discussion. 
40  Other Latin American countries also had experiences of alternating adherence 
to gold convertibility. See Fishlow (1987). 
4  1  See Eichengreen (1985, p.  5)  for a chronology of countries adopting gold. 
42  Giovannini  (19911 views the facts that both exchange rates and  short-term 
interest rates varied within the limits set by  the gold points in the  1899- 
1909  period  as  consistent  with  market  agents'  expectations of  a  credible 
commitment by the four "core"  countries to the gold-standard rule in the sense 
of this paper. 
43  See Eichengreen 11989b, p.  191  and Fishlow (1987,  1989). 
44  According to Giovannini (19861. however, the Bank of England did not follow 
the "rules."  while the Reichsbank did. 
4 5 Alternatively, the gold devices could be  interpreted as an effort to strain 
every nerve to avoid abandoning convertibility. 
46  According  to  Eichengreen  (1989b3, the  Bank  of  England's  ability  to ensure 
convertibility was aided by  cooperation with other central banks.  In addi- 
tion.  as mentioned  above,  belief  based  on  past  performance  that  England 
attached  highest  priority  to  convertibility  encouraged  stabilizing private 
capital movements  in  times of  threat  to  convertibility, such as in 1890 and 
1907. 
47  According to Giovanninies  (1989) regressions, the French and German central 
banks  adapted  their  domestic  policies  to  external  conditions, whereas  the 
British did not.  This can be  interpreted as evidence for British management. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm48~rossman'  s ( 1990  1  interpretat  ion of the historical record, though emphasizing 
different factors, accepts this view.  Thus, according to him, the ratio of 
government  debt  to  gross  national  product  increased  during  major  wartime 
episodes in Britain and the U.S.  from the mid-eighteenth century until after 
World War I, reflecting intertemporal substitution.  Such borrowing represent- 
ed  a  temporary effort  to  shift  resources from  the  future to  the  present. 
Following  each war, the  ratio of  debt  to  income would  then be  reduced  by 
contractionary fiscal  policy  accompanied  by  deflationary  monetary  policies 
that  maintained  the  real  rate  of  return on outstanding  bonds.  According 
to Grossman, such a policy was an investment in the credibility capital of the 
sovereign borrower -- a reputation for responsible repayment of the principal 
and for preservation of the real value of  interest payments that enhanced the 
probability of being  able to  borrow heavily again at  favorable rates in the 
event of a future war. 
49  According  to  North  and  Weingast  (19891, this process was  complete by  the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688.  After that date, capital markets developed in an 
environment free of the risk of sovereign appropriation of capital. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm50 An  alternative and  complementary explanation to  that offered in this paper 
relates to political economy considerations and  the distribution of  income. 
The configuration of political interest groups in the nineteenth century was 
favorable to  the hard-money, pro-gold-standard-rule position.  This may have 
been  related  to  the  more  limited  development  of  democracy  and  less-than- 
universal  suffrage.  Thus, a  comparison of  the  debates over .resumption in 
England from 1797 to 1821 and in the U.S.  from 1865 to 1878 suggests that the 
more limited suffrage in England in the early period served as a brake on the 
soft-money forces favoring permanent depreciation.  In the U.S.,  the  soft- 
money  forces favoring  redistribution of  income  to  debtors and  other groups 
(such as Midwestern manufacturers) almost carried the day. 
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The Financing of Wartime Expenditures in the 
French Wars and World War I 
A.  French Wars  B.  World War I 
1793-1815  (G.B. )  1914-1918  (U.K.  )' 
Percent of total wartime 
expenditures financed by: 
(1)  Taxes  58  31.8 
(2) Bonds  40.  5  64.4 
(3) High-powered money  1.5  3.8 
a~artime  expenditures are calculated as total government expenditures less 
1903-1913 annual average of total government expenditures. 
Sources by row:  (1  )  1793-1815: 0'  Brien (1967)  table 4; 1914-1918: 
Mitchell and Deane (19621,  pp. 392-395, 396-398. 
(2) 1793-1815: O'Brien (1967)  table 4; 1914-1918: 
Mitchell and Deane (19621,  ibid. 
(3) 1793-1815: Mitchell and Deane (1962).  pp. 441-443; 
1914-1918:  Capie and Webber (1985)  table 1(1), 
pp. 52-59. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2 
Ekpected and Actual Appreciation of the Greenback Dollar, 1869-1878 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Average  Expected 
Differential  Appreciation  Average Actual 
Between Gold  (Current  Rate of  Appreciation 
and  Differential Less  Greenbacks  Forecast 
Greenbacks  Differential for  Appreciation  Error 
Yieldt  July-December 1878)  to 1881$  (2)-(3) 
January-June  1869 
July-December 1869 
January-June  1870 
July-December 1870 
January-June  1871 
July-December 1871 
January-June  1872 
July-December 1872 
January-June  1873 
July-December 1873 
January-June  1874 
July-December 1874 
January-June  1875 
July-December 1875 
January-June  1876 
July-December 1876 
January-June  1877 
July-December 1877 
January-June  1878 
July-December 1878 
$  The average of monthly exchange-rate closings for the period was used to 
measure current gold price of greenbacks. The 6s  of 1881 were redeemable 
June 1, 1881. 
Source: Calomiris ( 1988, table 51. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3 
Autocorrelations of Inflation (Wholesale Prices, Annual  Data) 
Sample  Regime  Ljung-Box  Lags  Aut ocorrelat  ions 
Period  &-Test 
5% Critical V. 
(Standard E.) 
United Kingdom 
1730 -  De Facto  Q(18) = 16.79  1-4  -.02  -.59  -.I3  -.32 
1796  Gold  C(18) = 28.87  5-8  .ll  -.05  .02  .09 
(.I21  9-12  .04  -.04  .12  .02 
1797 -  Paper  Q(12) = 15.21  1-4  .26  -.37  -.41  .ll 
182  1  Pound  C(12) = 21.03  5-8  .37  -.03  -.I2  .03 
(.2O)  9-12  .12  -.lo  -.I9  .08 
1822 -  Gold  Q(24) = 25.50  1-4  .04  -.01  -.I4  -.22 
1913  Standard  C(24) = 36.42  5-8  -20  .O1  .13  .14 
(.lo)  9-12  .17  .04  -.07  -.lo 
1914 -  Paper and  Q(6)  =  3.71  1-3  .32  .09  .03 
193  1  Gold  C(6) = 14.07  4-6  -.05  -.lo  -.29 
Exchange  (.24) 
1730 -  Mixed  Q(24) = 44.50  1-4  .12  -.I5  -.24  -.I5 
1913  C(24)  = 36.42  5  -8  .10  .08  .04  .09 
(.07)  9-12  .07  -.05  -.02  .02 
1730 -  Mixed  Q(24)  = 35.69  1-4  .20  -.05  -.I1  -.lo 
193  1  C(24)  = 36.42  5-8  .05  -.05  .OO  .10 
(.07  9-12  -09  -.02  -.07  -.03 
United States 
Bimetallic  Q(24)  = 34.69 
C(24)  = 36.42 
(.24) 
Greenback  Q(6)  =  5.53 
C(6)  = 14.07 
( .24 
Gold  Q(12)  =  3.75 
Standard  C( 12)  = 21.03 
(.17) 
Gold  Q(6)  =  3.76 
Exchange  C(6)  = 14.07 
(.22) 
Mixed  Q(24)  = 55.97 
C(24  ) = 36.42 
(.09) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAutocorrelations of Inflation (Wholesale Prices, Annual  Data) 
- 
Sample  Regime  Ijung-Box  Lags  Autocorrelations 
Period  Q-Test 
5% Critical V. 
(Standard E.) 
1793  -  Mixed  Q(24) = 50.12  1-4  .25  .01  -.07  -.I1 
1933  C(24)  = 36.42  5-8  -.08  -.I5  -.lo  .ll 












1861 -  Mixed  Q(18)  = 16.38  1-4  .06  -.26  -.I7  .01 
1913  C(18)  = 28.87  5-8  .21  .09  -.I3  -.06 
(.I41  9-12  .02 -.I2  .03  .19 
Data Sources: 
United Kingdom; Mitchell and Deane (1962). 
United States; Jastrarn (1977). 
France; Mitchell (1975). 





clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmclevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 6  Risk Premium, Lira-Franc  Exchange Rate 
(Italian government bond yield minus French 3% rentes, 1866-1912) 
SOURCE:  Fratianni and Spinelli (1984). 
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